This does not mean that younger generations are necessarily apathetic or cut off from important issues. However, they are less likely to seek information from official institutional channels and more likely to define their interests in terms of personal lifestyle values and related activities such as buying fair trade products or changing personal living habits to address environmental concerns. What seems missing in many nations is a natural connection between these lifestyle issues and conventional political attachments through parties and voting. In addition to finding more diverse information sources and political outlets, increasing numbers of citizens of all ages seek like-minded information sources (Bennett and Iyengar 2008) . The selective exposure pattern may hold more for the U.S. than other societies, but better research is needed on where scattered audiences are getting their political information.
The changes that distinguish late modern societies from more coherent modern social systems include three three broad and interrelated areas that invite thinking differently about the nature of communication in contemporary public life.
• The fragmentation of public life Including the breakdown of broad social membership institutions such as unions, churches, public education systems, and related shifts in political party loyalties. This fragmentation of mass society corresponds to the rise of largescale networked publics, which contributes to…
• Changing media systems and communication processes New technologies and channels enable more fine-grained "many-to-many" communication within fragmenting societies. Communication has become increasingly personalized, both in the way messages are framed, and how they are shared across social networks. Individuals become active agents in the production and transmission of information, which leads to…
• Communication as political organization (that goes beyond messages, framing, and effects)
Younger generations prefer networked participation that relies less on formal organization than on peer recommendation and peer production of ideas and plans. In these technology-enabled networks, communication often goes beyond message transmission to become an organizational process.
The extent of these changes varies in different societies. Some countries such as the US and the UK have embraced them more fully than others, such as Germany, which still displays a higher degree of modernist social structure and communication. Current frameworks for comparing media systems note general similarities and differences (Hallin and Mancini 2004) , the change processes transforming communication systems in the digital age are not yet well established in theory, research or teaching. Not only is the volume of public information in the so-called digital age unsurpassed in human history, but its production, distribution and consumption patterns are changing in ways that also outpace current communication theories and research methods, with a few notable exceptions (Bimber 2003; Benkler 2006; Coleman and Blumler 2009 ). This analysis sketches the broad changes, illustrates them with examples from different countries, and shows how they impact communication and journalism research and education.
The Reorganization of Public Life
As publics became persuaded of the merits of deregulated markets, consumer lifestyles and economic growth that seemed limitless before the financial crash of 2008, even many of the parties on the left rushed toward so-called "third way" thinking about reduced commitments to labor protections, public goods, and social welfare. In many cases, parties on the left actually led the way with market reforms in core public sectors such as social services, health care and education. The ironic result was a political boomerang that benefited center right parties who charged the social democratic left (with some good reason) with becoming a pale imitation of the freedom loving center right. And so, the 21 st Century opened with the helpless drift of the legacy socialist parties in the UK, Sweden, Italy, Germany and elsewhere. The resulting race to re-brand seemingly empty political vessels led to further disillusionment with the political process for many younger citizens.
The separation of younger generations from guiding institutions such as parties and the press (which derives a good deal of its content from parties and government) left citizens with few stable models for managing distress and confusion. As many social scientists observed, individuals experienced an increased sense of personal risk and responsibility for managing their own life chances during these times of rapid social change (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991) . Cast adrift from broad party agendas, younger citizens increasingly attached themselves to issues connected to their lifestyles and personal values (Inglehart 1997; Bennett 1998 
Changing Media Systems
Citizens seeking more relevant coverage of their personal issue clusters create growing strains on journalism, which, in most places, continues to deliver government agenda-driven news to broad audiences. The legacy modern press system persists of course, but is followed mainly by older and more affluent demographics that support the old institutional order into which they were born. Meanwhile, younger citizens are turning to alternative sources of information, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that create information rich environments around their issues, and often personalize their communication through environmental policy messages using cute baby animals or fair trade and development policies pegged to endorsements from rock stars and actors. The emergence of vibrant issue communities on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites also suggests different kinds of information production and distribution than commonly studied in conventional approaches to news production and framing.
Even when young people report following the news through publications or online These shifting demographic trends in traditional information production and consumption have many implications for the communication processes we study and how we conceive of them. Among the most notable areas of change involve the gatekeeping or authoritative filtering of public information, upon which much of the research on media effects, persuasion, cueing, agenda setting, and public opinion formation depends (Bennett and Iyengar 2008) . As publics invest less authority in officials, journalists, and professionally spun communication (which defined the heart of the modernist mass media public sphere), information is increasingly self selected and constructed by social networks and shared via trusted recommendations from friends.
Some European scholars --particularly those living with still healthy public service broadcasters --tend to dismiss these trends as not applying to their countries. There are of course national variations, but few studies are able to explain the persistent shifts in the attention patterns of disaffected younger citizens. What often passes for defense of civic media traditions in some European systems are studies showing that quality journalism still exists, and that those who consume it continue to behave as ever before (de Vreese,
Albaek, van Dalen and Jebril 2013
). Yet both the audiences supporting these findings are aging and shrinking, putting the findings more in the service of reifying old modernist communication paradigms than helping to understand the new trends. The efforts to plug the dikes of multiplying information flows and fragmenting audiences are understandable, but they do not prepare us for handling change processes either theoretically or empirically.
As publics become more responsible for their own gatekeeping and authority schemes, the results are, not surprisingly, rather uneven. In some cases such as Wikipedia, the product is high quality information on a larger array of topics than ever before found in one source, or previously shared across language and culture divides. In other cases, however, information reaching large numbers of people reflects severe political views bordering on delusion. Witness, for example, the years of public discussion in the U.S. about whether Barack Obama was really born in the U.S. and in the view of those who doubted the authenticity of his birth certificate, whether he was legally qualified to be president. Such seemingly absurd beliefs can become magnified beyond anything that would have been admitted into the public sphere in conventional modern press systems that kept the gates of public information for much of the modern era. In the U.S., the controversies about the legal status of Barack Obama's birth raged on the Internet and were carried regularly into the quality news by politicians and celebrities who recognized the ease with which they could make news just by simply echoing the focus . Among other things, the organizational capacities of crowds may alter how we think about public opinion formation, as powerful frames may emerge from crowds and travel virally within and across societies. This occurred, for example, with the "We Are the 99%" meme that emerged during the Occupy Wall Street protests in the US. This frame touched broadly across society and became a media topic that raised the long buried issue of inequality in social discourse. Not only did the issue rise on the media agenda but it rose on the elite agenda as well .
By following the traces left by technology in crowd-enabled organization, we are able to see public opinion that arises outside of polling more clearly than ever before.
Indeed, the organic qualities of technology assisted association and information sharing become compelling to study, but often defy conventional analytical frameworks.
Communication scholars may continue to use and adapt alternative frameworks such as
Latour's Actor Network Theory (Latour 2005 ). Yet the sheer scale and complexity of technology equipped crowd organization suggests the need for new theories of crowdsourced information and related methods for handling the volume of "big data" they generate. The very logic of communication changes in contexts of large-scale peer production (Bimber 2003; Benkler 2006; .
The increasing prominence of crowd-sourced information flows invite developing new models and standards for public communication processes. In some cases, crowds are prey to rumor and misinformation, and may embrace them as fact. It may be prudent for journalism organizations to act as secondary filters on these crowd dynamics, helping to feed back outside perspectives into the crowd. This happened, for example, during the Occupy Wall Street protests in the U.S., as millions of tweets revealed a balance between links to first hand individual accounts and links to news reports containing pronouncements from political officials, police, and others outside the mobilizations (Agarwal, Bennett, Johnson, and Walker, 2012; Bennett, Segerberg, and Walker 2013) . Nonetheless, more attention is being paid to new information technologies, as they change the delivery and distribution of information, and enable citizens to become producers of news and public information. However, with a few notable exceptions, this emerging research is largely descriptive and unguided by theory that captures the social, psychological and political contexts in which these technologies operate.
Despite the evident changes, the conventional wisdom is still that the mass media should be the center of political communication research, based on the assumption that what elites say in the news establishes a feedback loop to citizens who vote for, or otherwise confer legitimacy on those elites. This is an old notion of the public sphere in which a system of well connected institutions (party, press, cultural and civil society organizations) maintain the information gates through with citizens receive news and ideas about who they are and how society is working.
In the current era many citizens are actively creating their own channels and methods to communicate directly with each other and to make that communication increasingly hard for both elites and the mass media to ignore or marginalize. The emergence of networked public spheres involves re-thinking the relationship between communication content and the organization processes that produce and distribute it. Put simply, communication processes are changing in ways that variously complement, compete with and in some cases, replace the forms that defined modern societies. What is more challenging still is that both modern and late modern systems are in play at the same time, meaning that new models must take into account the interaction of both kinds of communication processes (hierarchical/bureaucratic and distributed/networked) as they shape power, participation and public life in various societies. A fourth era of personalized, technology-enabled communication is clearly emerging, and our challenge is to understand it.
